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ABSTRACT 
WebRTC is an API that allows users to share streaming 
information, whether it is text, sound, video or files. It is 
supported by all major browsers and has a flexible underlying 
infrastructure. In this study we review current WebRTC structure 
and security in the contexts of communication disruption, 
modification and eavesdropping. In addition, we examine 
WebRTC security in a few representative scenarios, setting up and 
simulating real WebRTC environments and attacks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Web Real-Time Communication (WebRTC) is an API aimed to 
support browser-to-browser communication. This solution is 
designed to unify the fragmented solution cluster that has been 
dominating the market thus far. All innovations so far are 
standalone programs or browser plugins. These restrictions limit 
these solutions’ integration into a growing browser-based world. 
WebRTC comes as a solution for P2P file sharing, streaming P2P 
video and audio calls and soliciting real-time communication 
solutions into the end user's Web browser. 
Since it was first presented, WebRTC has been considered a 
disruptive force demonstrated by the amount and quality of 
services currently using and underlying the WebRTC solution in 
their products. Some representative examples are Facebook’s1 use 
of this technology in its mobile device messenger application, 
Firefox Hello,2 as well as addLive,3 which has been acquisitioned 
by SnapChat. The technology's effectiveness is especially visible 
by the number of startup companies that grew from it, 
demonstrating that this tool is not restricted just to the enterprise 
level such as VOIP, and can be leveraged by anyone. 
In this study we review WebRTC security, while focusing on the 
main players in a WebRTC application, exploring their security 
measures, such as access control, credential storage and 
cryptography. In addition, we analyze the WebRTC technology 
and present potential threats to a real world WebRTC featuring 
application [1]. 
As a multi-platform technology, different implementations of 
WebRTC may obey or disown RFC specification requirements. In 
addition, each WebRTC implementation may differ in uses (voice, 
video, chats, or online augmented reality). This implies that 
security evaluations must be performed for each implementation 
specifically. As WebRTC client applications are, at the moment, 
                                                                
1https://webrtchacks.com/facebook-webrtc/ 
2https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/firefox-hello-video-and-voice-
conversations-online 
3 https://bloggeek.me/snapchat-acquires-addlive/ 
primarily browser–based (though not all browsers support 
WebRTC) we focus our analysis on WebRTC browser-based 
impelmetations. A quick look at browser usage statistics reveals 
that currently, Chrome and Firefox dominate the browser market 
by a significant margin. In addition, these browsers also support 
key features of WebRTC technology which makes them prime 
candidates for our tests. 
Another point for consideration in the security analysis involves 
the communication restrictions of the current security measure 
(e.g., deep packet inspection Firewalls), as well as the availability 
of existing tools for analyzing the WebRTC traffic. 
2. WHAT IS WebRTC? 
In General, a WebRTC communication is composed of two 
stages: a signaling and a communication stage. 
2.1 Signaling Stage 
The signaling stage is the conversation setup. When two clients 
wish to communicate, they must arrange a common information 
channel. If client A wishes to communicate with client B, Client A 
must convey an address at which Client B may reach him. In 
telephony, this stage is attributed to Client A calling Client B. 
Client A dials client B’s phone number, and starts the call. The 
telecommunication company is now responsible of finding B in its 
network and notifying him that A is calling him. In turn, B can 
choose to answer, reject or ignore the call. All these options must 
be relayed back to Person A. In this scenario, the phone number is 
the address at which to reach client B. 
The general (common) WebRTC communication scheme is 
presented in Figure 1. When client A wishes to communicate with 
client B, the steps performed are: 
(1) Client A opens a local listening connection and sends a request 
to the signaling server to communicate with B. This request hosts 
information about the client’s capabilities (available media 
codecs, API version, etc.), as well as unique security identifiers: 
(a) unique session ID, (b) session start/end time, (c) session 
version (d) media stream identification, (e) ice-ufrag/ice-pwd – 
these values are used to initiate direct connection between peers. 
Once the direct P2P connection is established, these values will be 
used to authenticate each connection to the other, (f) DTLS 
fingerprint – when the two clients open a direct connection 
between themselves, they will use an asymmetric encryption for 
their communication, similar to TLS. When the two parties 
commence with direct communication, each client sends the other 
a TLS certificate; this fingerprint is used to ensure the TLS 
certificate’s authenticity once received. 
(2) The signaling server (optionally) authenticates A, and forwards 
the request to B. 
(3) Client B approves/rejects client A's request. If the request is 
approved, Client B opens a listening connection and sends the 
response to the signaling server. 
(4) Signaling server forwards response to Client A. 
(5) Assuming client B approved the request, client A and B 
exchange direct communication information. This includes IP 
where a listening interface is open for communication, connection 
type (TCP/UDP), and possibly NAT traversal information (IP/port 
bindings). 
(6) Both clients open direct communication channel with each 
other. 
A pre-condition for establishing WebRTC communication 
between A and B is that both must use an application or a Web 
service which implements/supports the WebRTC communication. 
This may be set using a browser where the clients browse to an 
online address or a locally stored page, or using a native 
application (e.g., Java, C++) with pre-stored local and remote 
configurations (Stage 0 in Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Example Of conversation process. 
2.2 Communication Stage 
Once participants have shared their information with each other, a 
direct channel is established and from this point on the two 
participants can exchange information without the signaling 
server's intervention. Since this is a new connection, both clients 
must re-validate each other. This is performed by re-sending 
information previously sent in the signaling phase (ice ufrag, ice 
pwd and DTLS certificate). Once both clients validate each other, 
they may communicate directly with each other. This stage differs 
from classic web communication due to the fact that 
communication is now server-less. In all classic browser 
communication platforms, each message sent from user A to user 
B is sent through the server. This increases latency and is a major 
breach in the user's privacy. 
2.3 WebRTC Gateway Typology 
WebRTC Gateways are mainly designed to allow 
telecommunication providers to harness WebRTC technology, 
while maintaining critical functionalities such as billing and 
lawful interception. The main difference is adding a proxy server. 
If Caller A wants to call recipient B, he actually performs a call to 
a proxy server C. Figure 2 illustrates the signaling process: (1) 
Alice sends a communication request to Bob’s virtual client via 
the signaling server. 
(2) Alice’s Virtual client initiates communication with Bob via the 
signaling server. 
(3) Bob approves communication with Alice’s virtual client. 
(4) Bob’s virtual client approves communication with Alice. 
(5) Both virtual clients initiate communication with each other. 
(6) All communication between Bob and Alice are tunneled 
through their virtual clients. 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the second WebRTC topology model. 
3. SECURITY IN WebRTC 
WebRTC security measures can be divided into three main 
groups: Client, Server, and Network Traffic. 
3.1 Server Security 
Since WebRTC is designed as a Peer-to-Peer communication 
interface, the server’s duty is the mediation of clients. As such, the 
roles performed by the server are implemented using pre-
WebRTC software components, such as STURN (Session 
Traversal Utilities for NAT) and IdP (Identity Provider). No 
additional designated security measures are created. 
3.2 Client – Access Control 
Since WebRTC is primarily designed to facilitate P2P audio and 
video chats, the facilitating browser should be able to access the 
microphone and video camera. This requires a user's consent. 
Major browsers implement two mechanisms. Media devices’ 
permission requests should be requested per use, unless stated 
otherwise by the user. Users must be informed of a media device 
being used in a clear and visible manner at all times of the 
resource's use [2]. A few examples of the access control 
mechanism are presented in Figure 3. 
3.3 Network Traffic – Channel Encryption 
3.3.1 Encryption 
WebRTC specification explicitly forbids clear RTP (Real-Time 
Transport Protocol) [3] and enforces using a secure encrypted 
version of it called SRTP (Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol). 
For this to be achieved, we must make the distinction between the 
signaling plane (HTTP, SIP) and the media plane (RTP). Each of 
these can be secured independently but this may be troublesome. 
This mechanism does not guarantee that the signaling user is the 
same as the media messaging user. Due to this deficiency, 
WebRTC specifications enforce encryption of both channels using 
DTLS-SRTP. This ensures that the establishment of the media 
stream can take place without the need to reveal the Session 
Descriptor Protocol in the message exchange. 
The DTLS-SRTP protocol is a variation of TLS, commonly used 
in an HTTP based session to achieve secure sessions between a 
client and a server (HTTPS). It is modified to accommodate the 
needs of live human to human communications, that is for 
example, when sending a file, the packet order is not important as 
data can be ordered upon data transfer completion [2]. 
Since TLS operations are considered to be expensive, SRTP 
(Secure Real-time Transport Protocol) is used as a lightweight 
encryption model for communications. DTLS-SRTP utilizes 
DTLS to bootstrap the SRTP key exchange over a higher 
encryption level channel to prevent MiTM attacks [1]. 
Another point to consider in this aspect is how the browser reacts 
to a proxy that tempers with encrypted certificates. In normal 
HTTPS applications, there is a clear warning in each browser that 
the channel is compromised. This warning allows a client to make 
an informed decision about using a non-secure connection to the 
web application. Under WebRTC this choice is not given, and 
such conversations are rejected by the browser. 
3.3.2 Certificate exchange 
When listening on a line between parties of a conversation, an 
attacker may want to be able to listen in to the communicating 
parties by performing a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack. 
Much like in standard TLS, certificate exchange is performed 
between the two parties. But two clients are not part of any 
Certificate Authority (CA), and a self-signed certificate is sent 
between them. In order for B to be able to guarantee A's 
certificate is authentic, the TLS certificate is sent the first time via 
the signaling channel, and then sent again via the media channel. 
At this point, the two certificates are compared for validity 
[4].This approach mitigates a MiTM attack as forging the 
certificate on the signaling channel requires breaking the SSL 
encryption to the signaling server. 
3.3.3  Client denial of service 
An attacker may attempt to prevent a client from being able to use 
a WebRTC application by overloading the client’s resources 
(bandwidth, processor or screen). In the proposed WebRTC 
architecture, finding a client requires using the identification 
process and respectful component, which allows the system 
administrator to monitor any suspicious activity and mitigate it 
thus. In addition, the dynamic architecture of the Internet allows a 
user to switch IP addresses in the case that a previous SDP is 
used. 
4. THREATS IN WebRTC 
At this point, we chose a "hands on" approach to exploring the 
existing threats on a WebRTC application. An attacker may be 
trying to obtain information and masquerade as a participant, 
along with arbitrary activation of media devices. 
We first decided to look at all the players involved: client, server, 
and information channel—and for each player, we searched for 
probable threats and their effects on the system: 
Client – What are the effects of JavaScript/HTML injection? 
Client – Can we steal WebRTC credentials? 
Client – Can we steal privileged information about a client? 
Server – What are the effects of taking over a signaling server?  
Server – Can we crash the server, or render it unresponsive? 
Information channel – What information can be extracted?  
Information channel – Can we cause a client to connect to a rouge 
network? 
For each player, we researched whether it is possible to disrupt a 
conversation, steal information or impersonate a user. 
The evaluation and analysis of the threats are summarized in 
Table 1. 
 
(3a) User is prompted for media device permission. 
 
(3b) User is prompted for media device permission (Android). 
 
(3c) User is informed while media device is in use. 
 
(3d) User is informed while media device is in use (Android). 
Figure 3: Examples of access control, when a client is using the 
camera; an icon indicating this will appear in the browser in a 
clear manner. 
Table 1: Summary of threats. 
 Server Client 
(Browser) 
Server Traffic Client 
(Android) 
Threat Malformed 
JSON 
JavaScript 
injection 
Takeover by 
code 
execution 
In line 
eavesdropping 
Information 
exposure via 
malware 
Description An attacker 
sends 
malformed 
JSON to 
server as a 
part of a 
legitimate 
request 
Inserting 
JavaScript 
into 
client's 
view of the 
website 
Attacker 
fond a 
weakness in 
the code that 
allows code 
execution 
Attacker taps 
the 
communication 
line to access 
residual data of 
WebRTC 
communication 
Malware 
attempts to 
disclosure 
information 
Possible 
outcome 
Server 
crashes 
Informatio
n 
exposure, 
identity 
theft 
Information 
exposure, 
identity theft 
, denial of 
service 
Information 
exposure 
 
Information 
exposure, 
identity theft 
Mitigation Input 
validation, 
server auto 
reboot. 
Input 
validation 
in server 
and client 
- - Applying 
Android 
guidelines, 
certificate 
pinning. 
 
4.1 Client - Browser 
While WebRTC Implements security measures to the extent of its 
context, it is important to note that WebRTC lives within a 
hosting browser. As such, a conventional web application attack 
effects the WebRTC environment and can be leveraged to gain 
information and assume actions on a victim's behalf. 
4.1.1 JavaScript injection 
Description: In this section, we assumed that an application is 
vulnerable to cross site scripting, allowing a user to insert HTML 
and JavaScript in the context of the application. We tested related 
security threats due to this flaw. 
While classical XSS (cross-site scripting) attacks are mostly 
mitigated by input validation at server side, WebRTC applications 
allow users to share information directly without a server as a 
mediator. This relation means that an attacker may send malicious 
code to a victim embedded within a text message, a display name 
or an attachment file name, that is sent in a P2P fashion. 
Mitigating this requires the receiving end to perform input 
validations on received or displied user supplied data. Malicious 
content may be executed in specific scenarios but not others. For 
example, the malicious payload may be filtered in the chat pane, it 
may be executed in the chat history pane [5]. 
Possible outcome: Attacker may be able to perform some or all 
the following: extract a password using phishing and/or send 
messages on the WebRTC platform of the site and capture 
conversation data. This vulnerability has been shown in multiple 
occasions, including our own research which leverages any part of 
a WebRTC application that is exposed to an HTML/JavaScript 
Element [6]. An example of such an attack is showin in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: WebRTC chat is susceptible to an XSS attack, this 
allows chat user A to perform actions on the behalf of user B. in 
the same manner, an attacker can leverage a persistent or non-
persistent XSS to sniff information, temper with chat participants 
and even gain privileged access to a server. 
 
4.1.2 Leveraging signaling for information disclosure 
4.1.2.1  Local client 
Description: Due to the nature of WebRTC, the browser must be 
able to access relevant information, such as the internal IP address 
of the machine. In a WebRTC application flow, this information 
will be used to establish a P2P connection without a server. Since 
this is a JavaScript API, it can be used in the context of any web 
application, allowing a server to collect this information from any 
client that uses its services in a browsing context. This problem 
was addressed from the construction of WebRTC [7] [8], but 
currently is still unsolved. A proof of concept of this was 
performed and is shown in Figure 6. Exploitation of this method 
requires the victim to have WebRTC enabled on his browser, once 
the victim browses to a malicious website, the attacker can 
activate WebRTC abilities via JavaScript code in order to gain 
sensitive information. 
Possible Outcome: This allows, in principle (and practice), an 
attacker to gain useful information about the victim and his or her 
network [3]. 
 
Figure 5: Demonstration of extracting an internal IP address via 
WebRTC. 
4.1.2.2 Remote Client 
Description: As described in the introduction, P2P 
communication via WebRTC requires both clients to have a 
communication address of the other peer. This communication 
address reveals information such as the client’s internal IP 
address. This knowledge allows an attacker to gain information 
about clients by opening a successful communication connection 
to them. Mitigation of this problem can be performed by applying 
an application architecture where a virtual client is a proxy to all 
the communication (as shown in section 2.3). By applying this 
architecture, the attacker can only view the virtual client's IP 
address, leaving the victim's IP known only to the application 
provider. 
Possible outcome: Gain privileged information, for example, an 
attacker may be able to map teams and roles of personal within an 
organization by mapping their internal IP address. This attack 
relays on the fact that members of the same team are usually 
positioned in the same location, therefore, will likely share the 
same subnet [8]. 
4.1.3 Malware facilitation using WebRTC 
Description: Web applications that allow users to share files 
amongst each other perform a security check on the file before 
sending it to the receiving party. A simple example of this is an 
email service blocking .EXE files to be sent. This test must be 
done at the server side as an attacker can edit a legitimate request 
after it was approved by the client side. In a WebRTC application, 
a conversation may take place where one client sends malware to 
another without any server intervention or knowledge. 
Since files are not delivered via a server, it is important to define a 
location where the file's contents may be sanitized (searching for 
viruses) and validated (digital signature, matching file type, etc.) 
prior to its deliverance to the receiving clients. Three models exist 
for such a case: 
a) (1) Client A sends file to server. (2) Server checks the file, 
(3) server sends file to client B. 
Advantages: Proprietary code for validation and sanitation 
remains private in server. 
Disadvantages: High bandwidth cost, each file is sent from 
and to the server. 
b) (1) Client A sends file to server. (2) Server checks the file, 
(3) server sends hash of the file to client B. (4) client A sends 
Client B the file. (4) Client B computes file's hash against the 
server's sent hash.  
Advantages: Proprietary code for validation and sanitation 
remains private in server.  
Disadvantages: High bandwidth cost, each file is sent to the 
server. Two files may be created to produce the same hash, 
one to be sent to the server and one to be sent to the receiving 
client [9]. 
c) (1) Client A sends client B the file, (2) client B checks the 
file. 
Advantages: Low bandwidth costs, all bandwidth costs are 
payed by the clients. 
Disadvantages: Private IP (Intellectual Property) of file 
sanitation and validation process will be shared with the 
users. 
Possible Outcome: An attacker may send a victim a malicious 
payload to be executed by the victim’s operating system. 
4.2 Client – Registration and Termination 
In this segment, we refer to considerations that must be taken for a 
WebRTC application in the context of registration and 
termination. These considerations are especially critical for an 
application that uses WebRTC as a replacement for GSM (Global 
System for Mobile) communications, with an emphasis on an 
application that allows a client to be connected in multiple 
locations at the same time (e.g., Apple Handoff [10]). Correctly 
registering and identifying users is critical to such services for 
monetary (billing) and security (lawful interception) reasons. 
4.2.1 Registration 
A client may register to a WebRTC application while providing 
no identifying details or allowing masquerading as a legitimate 
client. 
4.2.1.1 Registration authentication via email 
Description: An attacker opens an email account at some domain 
using no identifying features, then, proceeds to register to the 
WebRTC application. 
Possible outcome: an attacker can use the application, allowing 
him to provide false registration details. 
4.2.1.2 Registration authentication via phone number 
Description: Registration authentication may be bypassed using 
one of the following scenarios: 
(1) An attacker may use an Internet service for receiving 
SMS’s that requires no identification to register to the 
WebRTC application. 
(2) An attacker may use a pre-paid phone that requires no 
identification (some countries prohibit this). 
(3) An attacker uses a MiTM attack to access the verification 
SMS sent to a GSM client in a proximity allowing GSM 
data interception. This attack, while complex, was shown to 
be possible [11], [12].  
Possible outcome: an attacker can use the application, allowing 
him to provide false registration details. 
4.2.2 Session termination 
Description: Assuming an application allows a client to be 
connected in several locations at the same time (i.e., laptop and 
cell-phone), appropriate session termination mechanisms must be 
implemented. An attacker may be able to reuse an active session 
in a previously used (still logged in) device (e.g., a coffee place 
computer). 
As a countermeasure sessions must be terminated once the system 
decides a device is compromised (e.g., by using anomaly 
detection solutions). One example of this is detecting when two 
devices are active under the same user in two remote geographic 
locations). Furthermore, the system must inform and enforce the 
device’s session termination from existing active conversations. 
Since WebRTC allows for P2P actions, some actions may be 
performed without the server's intervention. This means that an 
attacker may perform actions under a victim's behalf (such 
continuing a conversation) while the victim's session is terminated 
in the compromised device. 
Possible outcome: the attacker can steal private information and 
execute actions under a client’s identity. 
4.3 Client - Android 
WebRTC can be implemented in Android in two ways: browser 
and native application. Native applications may embed an internal 
browser. In Android releases up to 4.3, WebView (browser API 
for native applications) does not support WebRTC capabilities. 
On the other hand, frameworks such as PhoneGap (Mozilla 
Cordova) allow WebRTC communication in a cross platform 
Web-Mobile Hybrid application. As a side note, there is always a 
possibility to take the piece of WebRTC code from an open 
source browser such as Chromium or Firefox, and integrate it into 
a native application. In this context, root privileges take an 
important role, as some features can be accessed only with root 
privileges. 
4.3.1 Installation permissions 
Description: An attacker creates an application that utilizes 
WebRTC to steal video/audio information. 
Possible outcome: An attacker may leverage this application to 
capture private information about the user. 
Android Solution: Installation of an Android WebRTC 
application prompts the user for specific privileges. At the 
minimum, a WebRTC application requires INTERNET 
permission. Telecommunication features also require 
RECORD_AUDIO and CAMERA permissions. 
4.3.2 Credentials storage 
Description and possible outcome: A malicious application tries 
to the capture credentials of an existing/installed WebRTC-based 
application. 
Android Solution: By default, Android applications store 
application data in the /data/data folder (i.e., the applications’ 
private folder). In order to read information from /data/data or any 
of its subfolders, root privileges are required.  
This means that unless the developer strictly defined otherwise, 
access without root privileges requires leveraging a flaw in the 
Android OS. 
4.3.3 Tempering with the network traffic 
We attempted to steal information from WebRTC applications in 
different settings: browser plugin, proxy, Android VPN (Virtual 
Private Network). While the conversation is protected by DTLS-
SRTP, a client’s credentials may be sent using an unencrypted 
channel beforehand, allowing an attacker to re-use the session. 
This scenario may take place when session credentials are sent 
over an unprotected channel, i.e., a non HTTPS connection to the 
WebRTC application server. In such a case, the attacker may 
masquerade as the legitimate client as well as acquire confidential 
information. 
4.3.3.1 Browser Plugin 
Description: An attacker attempts to install a browser plugin in 
order to steal WebRTC application credentials. 
Possible outcome: The attacker assumes the victim's identity. 
Android Solution: Testing was done on the two major browsers 
supporting WebRTC: Chrome and Firefox. While the mobile 
version of Chrome does not allow plugins, Firefox allows plugins 
the same abilities as it does to desktop applications. Browser 
plugins enable enhanced abilities to the browser, and have 
elevated permissions to define, capture and modify browser 
configurations—with defining a proxy for the browser being one 
of them. It is important to note that changing these configurations 
is not possible silently, and requires user approval. 
4.3.3.2 Android Proxy 
Description: A malicious application tries to redirect traffic to an 
unwanted destination by creating a proxy. 
Outcome: The attacker gains sensitive information. 
Android solution: While proxies can be defined by a user, in 
order for an application to configure a proxy on an Android 
phone, root permissions are required.  
4.3.3.3 Android Proxy via VPN 
Description: A malicious application tries to redirect traffic to an 
unwanted destination using a VPN Proxy. 
Outcome: The attacker gains sensitive information. 
Android solution: The Android VPN was investigated as an 
alternative to defining a proxy as the majority of applications that 
limit network traffic, as well as proxy applications such as Drony, 
Sendro and more, utilize this functionality. Defining a private 
VPN does not require a root, but requires a user's physical 
(click/touch screen approval) permission and cannot be performed 
silently. 
4.3.4 Credential theft via UI Phishing 
Description: (1) an attacker may create an application that 
performs the following: (a) the application UI impersonates the UI 
of an application to be attacked. (b) The application runs a service 
that checks what application is currently running in the 
foreground. (2)  The attacker manages to install the malicious 
application to the victim’s android device. (3) The malicious 
application runs in the background waiting for the application it is 
meant to impersonate to be opened. (4) Once the application is 
opened, the service opens the malicious application's UI, 
prompting the user for credentials. (5) The malicious application 
sends the information to the attacker and closes itself, returning 
the victim to the legitimate application [13]. 
Possible outcome: Credential theft, leading to information theft 
and actions performed in the victim's behalf. 
4.3.5 Application Impersonation 
Description: An attacker creates a clone of a legitimate 
application, and adds malicious code to the cloned application. 
This malicious application is then circulated to victims via social 
engineering. 
Possible Outcome: private information theft, including 
credentials, leading to actions performed under the victim's behalf 
in the application's context. 
4.4 Server 
4.4.1  Signaling Server Takeover 
Assuming an attacker can gain access to the signaling server, it is 
possible to: 
(1) Crash the system. 
(2) Connect random users into a conversation with each other. 
(3) Forward communication by creating an "invisible" user 
participating in a conference conversation; in Figure 6 we 
have shown an example of such an attack. 
(4) Perform a MITM by creating a fake user; each client will 
communicate with the fake user, believing they are 
communicating with each other. The fake user will proxy 
the conversation. 
 
 
Figure 6: [Top left to bottom right] Victim A, victim B, attacker. 
This demonstrates a MiTM attack in a WebRTC chat where the 
server is compromised. 
4.4.2 Crashing the server using malformed JSON 
In this section, we have explored the ability to attack a WebRTC 
signaling server by sending a malformed JSON to the signaling 
server. The JSON object is parsed as one unit, meaning that a fault 
in one part of the object, will cause an error to the whole parsing 
process.  
Description: An attacker sends a malformed JSON to the server 
as a part of a legitimate request (i.e. a new field in the ICE 
candidate message). When the server attempts to parse the JSON, 
it will produce an error and exit its main program loop. 
Possible outcome: Server exits main program loop due to an error 
in parsing the malicious JSON. The aftermath of this is that the 
server is now unresponsive to new requests. 
4.4.3 Registration Hijacking in SIP 
Description: Registration to the Idp can be provided by several 
protocols, as long as the protocol fulfills the WebRTC contracts. 
A common communication signaling protocol used heavily in 
VoIP applications is SIP (Session Initiation Protocol). In this 
protocol, a client may register itself to the server, sending 
information such as an IP address where they can be contacted at. 
This information is sent in plain text. As it is being sent in plain 
text, an attacker may capture and modify it so all calls will be 
forwarded to the attacker [1]. 
Possible Outcome: An attacker may masquerade as a different 
user, receive and perform actions at the victim’s behalf. 
4.5 Information Channel  
In this section, we detail how we tried to extract useful 
information, disrupt communication, or modify information by 
standing anywhere between the two clients. 
4.5.1 Concluding from encryption 
While WebRTC does hold a standard encryption to its 
information, it may still be possible to obtain some insight about 
the conversation type of two participating users and perhaps even 
extracting other useful information without tempering with the 
encryption. Mauro and Longoa (2015) showed a very high 
percentage of WebRTC communication classification, which 
brings about the question of whether an attacker can classify sub 
categories of WebRTC communication (e.g., a file is sent, audio 
call, video call), as well as additional useful information (if we are 
able to approximate the size and/or determine the type of a file 
that was sent). 
4.5.2 Communication Disruption/DOS 
Johnston, Yoakum, and Singh (2013) mentioned that enterprise 
firewalls allow for WebRTC communication due to false 
identification of a message as a response to a request. This 
suggests that an attacker can send packets to a client, fooling the 
firewall into thinking that these packets are a legitimate part of the 
conversation. Due to the UDP nature of WebRTC, IP spoofing is 
possible. At this point it might be possible to cause the firewall to 
block the legitimate conversation, though more research is still 
required [14]. 
4.5.3 Forceful use of rouge WI-FI network by 
leveraging server anti-DOS mechanism 
Description: One way of protecting servers from DOS (Denial of 
Service) attacks is to maintain a blacklist of IP addresses that 
where collaborators in a recent DOS attack. A possible scenario, 
is one where an attacker wishes to sway victims to use a malicious 
WI-FI network instead of a legitimate WI-FI network that is in the 
area. In our scenario, the attacker leverages the anti DOS 
mechanism to achieve this by performing the following attack: (1) 
attacker connects a device to a legitimate WI-FI. (2) Attacker 
attempts to perform a DOS attack on a WebRTC application from 
the legitimate WI-FI network. (3) Legitimate WI-FI external IP is 
blocked by the server. (4) Attacker creates a rouge WI-FI network 
aimed to exploit anyone that connects to it. (5) Clients, being 
unable to connect to the WebRTC application due to the IP 
blocking, may decide to connect to the rouge network in order to 
use the WebRTC application. 
Possible outcome: sensitive information theft or privilege 
elevation on victim’s devices. 
5. WebRTC IN TELECOMMUNICATION 
As demonstrated in Section 1, WebRTC has gained popularity 
among many applications and is being deployed heavily. The 
growing trend has sparked many innovative products. The focus 
of this section is inspecting WebRTC as an underlying framework 
for telecommunication companies. 
5.1 WebRTC-Tele-Model Security Concerns 
Implementing a WebRTC gateway network architecture (as 
illustrated in Figure 2) where communications are funneled to and 
from telecommunication servers means that in practice, 
conversations are decrypted, and re-encrypted on these servers—
turning them into valuable targets of attack. Implications may 
include the copying of information, as well as interchanging call 
participants without peers’ consent or knowledge. 
5.2 WebRTC-Tele-Model Efficiency Concerns 
Assuming there are more peers than servers, two possible 
architectures are feasible: (1) communication between peers, ran 
by one server alone, and (2) communication between peers, ran by 
several company-owned servers before reaching a peer. The 
advantage of the second solution is in the fact that it allows 
bulking conversations together and compressing their volume. If 
performed correctly, this may lower bandwidth throttle and thus 
company costs. At this point, it is an open question as to what is 
the best approach to take in this case. 
5.3 Lawful Interception for WebRTC via IP 
Multimedia Subsystem Using 3rd Party 
Gateway 
Although there are numerous WebRTC communication systems 
architectures, it is inevitable that the WebRTC IP Multimedia 
Subsystem (IMS) will take over and telcos will have to implement 
their WebRTC solutions in this model [15].  
IMS is a functional architecture for multimedia service delivery. It 
was design by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) 
and later on by TISPAN, the standardization body of European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). IMS allows 
easier network management, service implementation (billing, 
provision, provisioning etc.) and user management 
(Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) [16]. Therefore 
implementing WebRTC as IMS architecture will be the most cost-
effective solution for telcoes products [15]. 
WebRTC IMS standardization is an ongoing process since 2012 
conducted by 3GPP [17] and by the ETSI [18], Still there are open 
issues considering the IMS implementation and the lawful 
interception (LI) customizations. Meanwhile the 3GPP and the 
ESTI design the IMS components for WebRTC as: 
- WIC (WebRTC IMS Client) 
- WWSF (WebRTC Web Server Function) 
- WAF (WebRTC Authorization Function) 
- eP-CSCF (P-CSCF enhanced for WebRTC) 
- eIMS-AGW (IMS Access Gateway enhanced for 
WebRTC) 
We assume that most of the WebRTC Communication Service 
Providers (CSP) will assist a 3rd party WebRTC Gateway 
Provider (GWP) to establish the connection with internal and 
external WebRTC clients [19], it's still not clear how the 
responsibility of WebRTC LI will be divided between the CSP 
and the 3rd party GWP. 
IMS architecture solves many of the WebRTC standard 
requirements among them is lawful interception, which is already 
defined for IMS by the 3GPP and ETSI [20] and is globally 
accepted. Implementing LI solutions for different WebRTC 
architectures will be infeasible for CSPs due to the complexity the 
architecture and the lack of standardization of the WebRTC 
protocol. 
The CSP should provide LI from the point when the commercial 
service is established and they shall co-operate immediately with 
the Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) and able a provision of 
targets to be on real-time basis. The ETSI also stated that the LI 
requirements are also relevant to 3rd party CSP, in our case the 
GWP. 
As we see the WebRTC IMS architecture, the general presence of 
responsibilities and information between the CSP and the GWP 
should be as the following: the CSP will possess most of the 
information related the target's identity and enabled services 
where the GWP will be responsible to the delivery of the 
communication with other clients. Because WebRTC is 
established in RTCP most of the communication provision should 
be handled by the GWP, nevertheless it should be agreed in 
advance between the CSP, GWP and the LEA [20]. 
Under the ETSI current design for the WebRTC IMS [18], we 
propose the following (see Table 2) allocation of responsibilities 
between the CSP and the GWP (Figure 7) on data shared with the 
LEA. 
 Table 2: LI allocation of responsibilities - CSP and GWP 
Group Item Responsible 
General Intercepted information 
Specific 
identifiers for LI 
Lawful interception identifier (LIID) – shall 
uniquely identify the target in the SP such as 
Telephone number or URI 
CSP 
Network identifier CSP 
Location (changes 
between LEAs) 
Current geographic CSP 
Physical location CSP 
Intercepted 
information 
Identities that attempted telecommunication with 
the target identity 
GWP 
Identities used by the target CSP 
Details of services used and their parameters CSP 
Intercept related information (IRI) 
Events – IRI 
packet 
target CSP  
Second party GWP  
Correlation 
indications of 
IMS IRI 
Call-ID, From tag, To tag GWP 
IMS Charging ID CSP 
Correlation 
indications 
Call-ID, From tag, To tag   GWP 
IMS Charging ID CSP 
Connection addresses and ports GWP 
Content of Communication (CC) 
RTP multimedia RTP multimedia packet- RTP header, UDP 
header and IP header 
GWP 
Copy of the multimedia stream also correlated 
with CIN 
GWP 
Encryption Remove encryption applied on content   GWP 
Provide decryption keys that are available GWP 
Security aspects 
General build-in in the IMS architecture CSP+GWP 
 
 
Figure 7:  Alice uses WebRTC IMS via CSP and is under the 
local LEA provision. 
6. RELATED WORKS 
Rescorla (2013) reviewed the WebRTC main threats and 
formatted a technical security architecture models [21] [22] to deal 
with them. Rescorla's drafts map the current security state of 
WebRTC, suggesting specific technical solution for each threat. 
For example, to deal with communication security he 
recommended using DTLS/DTLS-SRTP and not allowing 
JavaScript to access to computations of the DTLS key. For 
Authentication, he detailed an IdP Mechanism, and for DDOS he 
suggested implementing a sensible flow control. 
Based on Rescorla's drafts, Werner (2013) proposed security 
mechanisms which stand for the CIA information security 
principals [2]. The framework is built from four components: (1) 
Server– delivers the application and enables the signaling between 
the browsers (2) Browser – the runtime environment (3) Signaling 
path – http(s) or webSockets (4) media path – the data 
transformation protocol. 
Mauro and Longo (2015) had successfully recognized encrypted 
WebRTC sessions using decision theory together with typical 
traffic features such as: inter-arrival times, packet lengths and the 
number of sent and received packets. In the future, we believe that 
Machine Learning can be used to extract information about the 
user’s activity, the length of the conversation and the transferred 
objects (audio, video, files etc.) [14] 
López-Fernández et al. (2014) investigated authorizations models 
in WebRTC. A Bad authorization model might financially harm a 
company (users can gain free access to paid services) and also 
damage the user’s privacy (attacker could masquerade as the user) 
[23]. They explored two authorization models for WebRTC: (1) 
access control lists (ACLs), and (2) capability-based security 
(CAP). ACL control is that in which users rescue permission on 
an object and CAP uses a specific token for a permission. While 
CAP is faster, ACL has more functionality. 
Koistinen (2014) explained and demonstrated how to implement 
the DTLS-SRTP functionalities to the traditional WebRTC 
browser to browser (P2P) model and measures the encryption 
impact on the performance [24]. The results shows that a single 
(S)RTP calls packet processing delay mostly under one 
millisecond time, Koistinen claims that this kind of delay is 
acceptable in the real world. 
Johnston, et al. (2013) claimed that enterprise might have 
difficulties dealing with WebRTC due to restrictive enterprise 
firewall or untraceable P2P connection [25]. They suggest some 
general approaches to dealing with this issue but concluded that 
there is still missing enterprise authorization and application of 
WebRTC traffic policy. 
Aghila and Chandirasekaran (2011) showed that SDES, ZRTP 
and MICKY are prone to Man-in-The-Middle attacks. Therefore 
WebRTC was designed with a default encryption of DTLS-SRTP. 
In this research we based our findings on the similar encryption 
problems of the SDES [26]. 
 
Table 3: Summary of related works. 
Reference Title Description 
[21] WebRTC Security Architecture Technical security measures against 
various threats 
[22] Security Considerations for 
WebRTC 
A general overview of 
WebRTC threats  
[2] WebRTC Security in the 
context of a DHT 
implementation 
A general implementation of a 
security solution to deal with 
Rescorla Security Considerations 
[14] A Decision Theory Based Tool 
for Detection of Encrypted 
WebRTC Traffic 
Prediction of WebRTC protocol 
sessions in the wild using Decision 
Theory. 
[23] Authentication, Authorization, 
and Accounting in WebRTC 
PaaS Infrastructures 
Review of two authorizations models 
(CAP/ACL) 
[24] Implementation and Evaluation 
of Security on a Gateway for 
Web-based Real-Time 
Communication 
Implementation and performance 
review on DTLS-SRTP 
functionalities 
[25] Taking on WebRTC in an 
Enterprise 
Enterprises’ challenges to dealing 
with WebRTC authorization and 
application of a security policy 
[26] An Analysis of VoIP Secure 
Key Exchange Protocols 
Internet 
Penetration testing on SDES, ZRTP 
and MICKY shows that DTLS-SRTP 
is also immune against MITM attack. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
WebRTC is a good example of a properly designed technology; it 
shows a rapid deployment as well as high flexibility and 
adaptation to its surrounding protocols, encryption schemes and 
hosting environments. To most, WebRTC displays sharp abilities 
when it comes to privacy and security. But WebRTC is not a 
standalone solution; it requires a host application, a hosting server 
and a transportation layer connecting them. In this article we have 
demonstrated attacks against each of these underlying components 
which shows that while a WebRTC application comes with a set 
of strong security features, it is not immune to direct attack 
against its components, as well as its vulnerabilities on its 
underlying host application. 
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